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ABSTRACT  
Contrary to the common approach of stress-testing under which banks are evaluated whether 
they are distressed, this empirical study chooses to move from the micro stress test approach 
to a wider new macro stress test category. By being able to stress testing the entire economy of 
the Eurozone, it will permit big banks to fail and, at the same time, will open room for new 
banking players to enter the sector, promoting the essence of a healthy destruction. The analysis 
performs a battery of stress tests, by implementing VaR, Cornish-Fisher VaR, Monte Carlo 
VaR, Expected Shortfall, Cornish-Fisher Expected Shortfall, and Monte Carlo Expected 
Shortfall. At the same time, it explicitly considers the new regulatory approach of IFRS9 to 
incorporate extreme values from forecasted series in the distributions. The analysis also 
performs two versions of stress tests, one including TARGET2 and one without it. The results 
document that future stress tests should include TARGET2 values in order to capture a better 
picture of the stressed economy. The findings from these stress tests clearly illustrate that 
although there has been a trough after the distress call of 2008, this trough ended. These are 
results derived without including the TARGET2 transfers. By including the TARGET2 
transfers we receive a different picture that possibly acts as a protective mechanism against any 
future crisis. Caution is still advised, possibly due to some lingering imbalances within the 
Eurozone.          
Keywords: Macroprudential policy; financial stability; macro stress test; systemic risk; 
European Banking Union 
JEL Classification: G21; G28 
 
1. Introduction 
In their notable parallelism between the overall economy and the human body, Kahou and 
Lehar (2017) sketch the financial system as the cardiovascular system, with the banks 
representing the veins while the capital corresponds to blood. For the sake of financial stability, 
core banks are crucial for their extensive networks, carefully developed with other financial 
institutions. Papadimitriou et al. (2013) stress out that we should shift our attention to financial 
3 
 
institutions’ relevant neighbourhood, rather than focus on the misleading narrative of being 
‘too big to fail’ institutions. The repercussions of this tenacity generate a wrong direction 
towards future regulatory arrangements and raise suspicions when the potentially excessive 
protection deprives the financial system of the Schumpeterian creative destruction. Creative 
destructions stand as a fundamental feature of a healthy capitalism (Schumpeter, 1928) for the 
development of future products (financial in our case). One of the outcomes of Basel III adds 
pressure to financial institutions and leads to the deceleration of money circulation available 
for households and businesses (Samitas and Polyzos, 2015). The effects of the recent credit 
crunch are alarming, which build up to a 30% reduction of total bank credit, triggering as a 
consequence a credit-recession vicious circle. 
     The policy response has been a call for support for ailing banks to restore their capital 
position from fiscal resources. The injection of fresh capital was requested firstly through 
recapitalization1, secondly through additional purchases of their impaired assets at above 
market prices, third, through the provision of guarantees over existing and new financial 
products and, finally, by permitting tax concessions, even support from non-state investors.2 
To this end, central banks provide a ready alternative of the last resort when the above measures 
fail to deliver the expected results3. Hence, prudential regulation is needed in the form of capital 
liquidity to provide resilience against systemic risk4.  
In the European context, the flight to quality of deposits from the periphery of Eurozone 
to stronger German banks (Abad et al., 2013) appears to have had a huge governmental backing 
(Acharya and Mora, 2015). Bailing out banks does not deny the fact of raising social welfare 
costs (Rochet and Vives, 2004), or the fact that European banks were encouraged to borrow 
cheap money from the European Central Bank (ECB) and buy their home country’s sovereign 
debt (Drechsler et al., 2016). The Europeanized bank safety net architecture erected to combat 
the diffusion of contagion by applying macroprudential policies, which in the end, resulted in 
the European Banking Union (EBU). The EBU consists of four main pillars, namely, the Single 
                                                          
1 Which can reach up to a bank’s full nationalization. 
2 With government connections buying the portfolios of problematic assets. 
3 Volcker (1984) argues that the principal reason for the foundation of the Federal Reserve Bank in the US in 1913 
was to assure a smooth operation of the payments system. Lessons from history advise that the Bank of England 
was a mature lender of a last resort, a role it had perfected in the course of the nineteenth-century (Billings and 
Capie, 2011). Back then, commercial banks were obscuring on the purpose of publishing their true positions, 
firstly, to smooth out fluctuations of performance over the business cycle and, secondly, to present a picture of 
strength and stability for foreign investors, thus, gaining their trust to easily place their money on them (Billings 
and Capie, 2009). 
4 As long as it does not protect shareholders who are favoured too much with political support to bear the cost of 
their investment choices.  
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Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), and the Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF), while a Single Deposit Insurance Scheme (SDIS) is still pending 
construction. All of these are being coupled by a single rulebook5, containing certain rules in 
relevance to prudential regulation, supervision, resolution and the guarantee of bank deposits. 
The mechanisms are a by-product of the financial crisis and designed to apply mainly for the 
euro area countries.  
     This infrastructure is in contrast opposition to the no-bailout orthodoxy in the Eurozone6, 
under which to avoid moral hazard, any ailing institution should be preferably restored to 
soundness with private resources or bailed-in at a pre-resolution stage. In practice, the 
resolution proved to be the rule rather than the exception. The repercussions are evident in 
fuelling a debt-deflation spiral when countries are deprived of their monetary policy tools. 
Currently, the ECB is responsible for the supervisory responsibility of the Systemically 
Important Credit Institutions (SICI)7. When a bank is found to be non-viable8, then under the 
first pillar, its resolution will be carried out by the Banking Union’s second pillar: the SRM, 
supported by the third pillar or the SRF. To make a comparison with the US, it is worth 
mentioning at this point that the supervisory landscape on the other side of the Atlantic is a mix 
between supervisory authorities and rating agencies (Apergis et al., 2012). This is contrasted 
with the Eurozone, where only a regulatory supervision mechanism is in place. One of the 
major criticisms today is that there is not only a declining competition in the banking sector 
with oligopolistic tendencies (Apergis, 2015), or barriers to new bank entries (Apergis et al., 
2016), but also that bank opaqueness is a serious issue (Berger and Davies, 1998; Iannotta, 
2006; Flannely et al., 2013). In this case, supervisory tools are put in place to reduce bank 
opaqueness, including deposit insurance and risk-based capital requirements (Petrela and Resti, 
2013). 
Out of experience, bank stress tests are still no transparent and regulatory bodies make 
that information available on an aggregate cross-country basis, rather than on a bank-specific 
one. The approach in this paper aims at providing a new policy orientation, under which not 
even a single bank would be big enough to fail, with small or core banks being allowed to 
                                                          
5 The prudential framework is supported by the Capital Requirements Directive and the Capital Requirements 
Regulation taking place before a bank fails; once it fails, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive take place. 
6 Supported by the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. 
7 They have to be EBU members. 
8 When national Deposit Guarantee Arrangements (DGA) have failed. 
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compete for depositors9. The framework for macro stress testing the economy allows banks to 
default and to pursue collateral in their interbank transactions, while it promotes a liberal 
approach towards bank entries. If macro stress tests are designed correctly, they can prevent 
unnecessary credit crunches (Arnold et al., 2012). The analysis wishes to believe that a 
minimum deposit guarantee is important for new entrepreneurs to enter the banking sector.  
     Section 2 begins by outlining the literature on contagion, macroprudential policies, the 
importance of which lies on policy responses to absorbing spillovers from the financial sector 
towards the real economy and argues how we should move from micro-macro stress tests to 
pure macro stress tests (stress testing the economy) by presenting the methodological approach 
followed. Section 3 presents the data and the methodological strategy applied. To this end, the 
analysis practically incorporates the new International Financial Reporting Standard 9 
(henceforth, IFRS9), which introduces a new way of performing stress tests from January 1st, 
2018. Section 4 reports the empirical findings and introduces levels of readiness, conditional 
on the increasing severity of the alert. Section 5 concludes by discussing the findings within 
the existing bank safety net infrastructure in the Eurozone. The findings offer the opportunity 
to shift away from strict regulations on banking to specific players and open the profession to 
new players. Finally, in section 6 policy implications are included with wider applications to 
the Eurozone economy and its implicit infrastructure safety net.   
2. Literature review  
2.1. Contagion 
An accurate definition of contagion comes from Hasman (2013). He defines it as the 
transmission of the idiosyncratic risk from one bank towards other credit institutions or 
businesses. As Cifuentes et al. (2005) adhere, uncertainty is stimulated when forced sales of 
assets generate a volatility feedback, which, in turn, are producing a downward spiral in asset 
prices. In the literature, bank failures can be interpreted through a different lens. One line of 
thought suggests that this is a coordination problem across depositors with different 
consumption horizons (Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).  
     In light of the 2008 financial crisis, bank failures tend to favour a chain reaction of events 
materialized from asymmetric information. Based on the existing literature, asymmetric 
information is accentuated by excessive risk-taking (Fortin et al., 2010) when management 
                                                          
9 New technology and blockchain will allow an upwards moving trend.  
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focuses on size10, rather than on performance (Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Bhagat et al., 2015), 
when regulatory authorities permit soft lending controls or predatory lending (Tippit, 2014), 
when there is a lack of accurate monitoring from credit agencies (Piazollo, 2006; Bozovic et 
al., 2011), and liquidity mismatches due to premature liberalization (Bird and Rajan, 2001). As 
if these were not enough, bad news alarms investors adding exogenous information on already 
liquidity problems (Gorton and Metrick, 2012) and volatile equity prices (Apergis and Apergis, 
2017).  
     That spiral resembles very much a Minskian transformation, with financial positions 
evolving from hedge to speculative when financial arrangements are disrupted (Papadimitriou 
and Wray, 1997). To withhold contagion, scholars have argued for government intervention 
through a central bank as a lender of last resort (Goodhart, 1987), as well as reforms in banking 
regulations (Allen and Carletti, 2010). In the same manner, contagion can be contained when 
the regulator provides insurance to uninsured depositors and when the number of banking 
failures is quite large, helping eventually banks to attract deposits at cheaper costs (Penatti and 
Protopapadakis, 1988). The domino effect can be generated by the uncollateralized exposure 
of commercial banks’ risk in the interbank market (Rochet and Tirole, 1996), despite the fact 
that maintaining these credit lines reduces the cost of maintaining reserves. In effect, this 
ultimately causes frequent coordination failures (Freixas et al., 2000), especially when banks 
use this channel to protect themselves against real shocks, instead of fuelling the economy 
(Hasman and Samartin, 2008). Towards this end, microprudential regulations from Basel I and 
II were designed in a manner to minimize the risk of each institution in isolation and protect 
depositors. The unintended contribution made the system more fragile to macroeconomic 
shocks generated by counterparty risks (Zawadowski, 2013). It is that dimension Basel III is 
trying to resolve by considering the importance of systemic risk (Drumond, 2009).             
2.2. Macroprudential policies 
Before Basell III the argument was that the existing regulatory framework from Basel 
I and II had a micro-based nature and could not ensure the safety of the financial system as a 
whole (Borio, 2003). The underlying logic of microprudential orientation rests on the notion 
that if each financial institution is given assurances of its soundness, then the aggregate result 
would be financial stability (Borio, 2011). A penetrated insight from Geanakoplos (2010) 
informs us how it all starts with an expansionary policy from the central bank, while optimism 
                                                          
10 Usually hiring for political favours. 
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flourishes in the economy. As the story goes, suddenly the economy is exacerbated and the 
potential losses are requested to be covered by a deposit insurance guaranteed by the 
government (Anginer et al., 2014). In parallel, banks’ shareholders have limited liability to 
exercise any influence11 (Keeley, 1990). Then all of the sudden, the tap is turned off and 
volatility arises in asset prices (Tirole, 2011), leading to a credit crunch or scarcity in the loan 
markets (Bernanke et al., 1991). As a result, this forces financial institutions to fire sales or sell 
some of their assets, inaugurating a dramatic drop in their prices (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). 
This contributes to feedback effects, generating a cascade of fire sales (Shleifer and Vishny, 
2011). Hanson et al. (2011) argue that the ultimate course of action of such macroprudential 
policies is to minimize the social cost of banks’ balance sheet shrinkage, stemming mainly 
from credit crunches and fire sales.  
     Rochet and Tirole (1996) define systemic risk as the propagation of an agent’s economic 
distress to other agents linked to the first agent when financial transactions between them fail. 
In this paper, we define systemic risk in a manner that brings us closer to market risk. Hence, 
the economic risk would be a more suitable definition, because we do not wish to restrict 
ourselves with agents who link themselves directly. Indirect influences by unforeseen changes 
of the underlying positions in banking portfolios, such as stock and bond prices, exchange rates 
or any variable might imply useful information on where to position itself. For instance, we do 
believe that if the counterpart is a bond issuer, then the risk of her default due to factors beyond 
her control are there. Still can be foreseen and allow for early action. 
     To examine the consequences of macroeconomic shocks we consider that banks have 
correlated portfolios or established networks (Papadimitriou et al., 2013). However, 
macroprudential policies are accompanied by limitations to credit growth (Akinci and 
Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018), with an increase in capital requirements, lower lending to domestic 
firms and households and reduced aggregate expenditures (Meeks, 2017) or international 
lending (Avdjiev et al., 2017). That might make sense, since taming a financial boom requires 
first taming the source that keeps inciting it or having countercyclical effects (Altunbas et al., 
2018). That is tricky when macroprudential measures are introduced concurrently with a lax 
monetary policy (Fahri and Tirole, 2012). No matter how somebody looks at it, the role of 
macroprudential policies is to limit risks in the banking sector, while the governments can still 
follow their own monetary policies most suitable for their constituents.   
                                                          
11 As long as they are satisfied with their dividends.  
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2.3. Stress testing 
The role of macroeconomic factors is so important driving deposit withdrawals, apart 
from bank-specific variables (Levy-Yeyati et al., 2010). In our view, this independent exposure 
can have significant macroprudential implications for macroeconomic risks, with Calomiris 
and Mason (2003) calling for an early attention to macro factors in banking supervision. 
Drehmann and Tarashev (2013) ascertain that banks can transfer the shocks that affect them to 
the real economy. The financial crisis of 2008 gives us a recent image of the pervasive 
implications for GDP growth, trade and employment rates.  
     An early attempt to analyse the impact of macroeconomic factors in stress testing was 
employed by Apergis and Payne (2013). However, there is still no mechanism in the literature 
that can act as an early warning signal when the economy is facing the risk of financial 
instability. Our methodology, however, is different and aims at incorporating stress tests and 
risk modelling. Kupiec (1998) and Alexander and Sheedy (2008) try to bridge these distinctive 
frameworks12. In particular, Kupiec (1998) examines cross-market effects resulting from a 
market shock, while Alexander and Sheedy (2008) argue that due to this approach, promising 
nonetheless is being vulnerable to a considerable degree of model risks and back-testing 
methodologies should be performed in order to tackle the issues of misspecification. Moreover, 
Zayernyuk et al. (2015) argue that the macroeconomic models used for stress testing barely 
take into account the full spectrum of shocks and risk factors and require satellite models, rather 
than focusing on specific financial variables.  
     Foglia (2009) defines macro stress tests as the method that links macroeconomic drivers of 
stress with bank-specific measures of the credit risk. Borio et al. (2014) have introduced the 
role of systemic importance, as well as the notion of macro stress tests, while Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2016) highlight the importance of forward-looking risk measures. In this paper, 
we use both approaches to measure risk exposures and correlations between the banking system 
and the macroeconomy, with IFRS9 incorporating the forward-looking tenets. It is because 
financial intermediation promotes economic growth (Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000; Apergis et 
al., 2007) that forces government regulation to offset the instability caused by the presence of 
deposit insurance (White, 1989). Usually, the approach goes as stress events happening in 
macroeconomic variables13 and that is linked to variables measuring asset quality14, which 
                                                          
12 Stress tests combined with risk modelling 
13 In the literature is known as the macroeconomic model 
14 In the literature is known as the satellite model 
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impacts on banks’ balance sheets in terms of earnings or capital. This whole design, though it 
has a rudimentary rationale behind it, we do believe that it would easier give an idea of what 
the banks actually see with their own eyes. To be explicit, instead of the ‘bird’s eye view’ of 
usual macro stress tests, we choose a ‘wearing your shoe approach’. Essentially, we use the 
variables any bank would use to construct a portfolio assuming that every bank thinks the same 
way. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013) support that portfolio risks or stock market performance is 
associated with stronger capital positions. Usually, a bank estimates the entire portfolio loss 
distribution. We expect the shape of the right-hand tail of the portfolio distribution to be to a 
large extent dependent on key risk factors or correlations between the risk components of 
macroeconomic and financial variables. Stressed loss distributions are used to examine stressed 
scenarios in a consistent setting (Foglia, 2009).  
     In their stress test scenario, Jimenez and Mencia (2009) introduce artificial 3-standard-
deviation shocks in only two macroeconomic variables (i.e., GDP and interest rates) separately 
and report percentage changes caused in their Value at Risk (VaR). Here, we need to highlight 
that VaR helps us to measure the potential loss magnitudes experienced by banks associated 
with tail events in the financial sector or the general economy. This effect is sensitive when 
banks have invested in non-traditional bank activities, influencing their profitability or 
insolvency (Apergis, 2014). This approach clearly sends an early warning about the potential 
systemic risk existing in financial markets, which is the outcome of the entanglement of the 
financial sector with other economic activities.               
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data 
Equity indices are a good measure to provide evidence of contagion effects or systemic 
risks in the banking sector (Kupiec, 1998; Kanas, 2004; Lehar, 2005). Depending on the 
interest rate, the 10-year bond positions must be held to generate investments of a size 
comparable to an investment in the equity market index. In this paper, we will not use the 
probability of defaults as suggested by Basel III for micro stress tests, because we do believe 
that the probability of defaults is underestimated in the pre-crisis period due to large banks 
groups owing a significant number of subsidiaries (Li and Dong, 2016). Additionally, we use 
government bond yields in order to capture stock-bond correlations. According to Petmezas 
and Santamaria (2014), portfolio rebalancing can have substantial contagion effects.  
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One of the major characteristics of the European sovereign debt crisis has been the 
strong nexus between Euro area sovereigns and banks. This nexus was the end result of the 
large holdings of sovereign debt by financial institutions across the Eurozone. According to 
this, adverse shocks stemming from sovereign banks contributed to the rise in that sovereign 
credit risk. In addition, a deterioration in a country’s fundamentals, as well as a surge in 
sovereign credit risks fuelled the increase in bank credit risks (Alter and Beyer, 2014; 
Fratzscher and Rieth, 2018). In order to take explicitly into account this nexus in our modelling 
approach, the analysis calculates the credit default swap spreads, with Germany being the base 
reference for our calculations. This enables us to consider any potential contagion effects and, 
thus, to include them in the modelling approach.      
We further use the TARGET2 loans15 received by the ECB, which is a credit 
transmission mechanism and works when credit institutions cannot find any credit line in the 
private interbank market (Sinn and Wollmershauser, 2012; Abad et al., 2013; Auer, 2014; Erler 
and Hohberger, 2016). The transmission mechanism of the crisis starts when investors diversify 
during a crisis period by short selling bonds and acquiring long positions in equity markets, 
while the opposite is supported by Baur and Lucey (2009). Whatever the direction, 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) argue in favour of a volatile liquidity spiral between stock 
and bond markets. As far as the foreign exchange rates are concerned, we will rely on Falcetti 
and Tudela (2008) who link banking with currency crises in addition to further macroeconomic 
variables that can help to pinpoint contagion. Risks spill over into the European markets due 
to the exposure and trade activities with foreign trade of financial partners (Gramlich et al., 
2017).  
In the build-up, as well as during the crisis, TARGET2 balances reflect the capital 
flights directed from the financial institutions of the EMU South to the financial institutions of 
the EMU North. These balances were primarily reduced in the period following the main stage 
of the Eurozone crisis (i.e., during the period 2012-2014). However, since the first quarter of 
2015, the ECB has embarked on massive government bond purchases under its quantitative 
easing (QE) program. As a result, TARGET2 balances increased significantly, reflecting the 
ECB’s bond purchases activities. We adjust the weights in TARGET2 balances, thus, removing 
any divergent information when moving from the pre- to the post-2015 period. More 
                                                          
15 Although we approximate to ECB loans since they represent claims and liabilities of Euro area national central 




specifically, we make use of weights on TARGET2 balances derived from these ECB bond 
purchases activities. Bond purchases, however, from the ECB do not enter into our model as 
exogenous variables. They are used only to weight our primary variable.  
As far as the ECB policy rates is concerned, Apergis (2017) demonstrates that interest 
rates affect not only price and output stability, but also financial stability. Financial stability is 
reflected on the recent trend of central banks acquiring macroprudential portfolios. The two 
major methods of measuring risks are those of the VaR (plus two extensions) and the one of 
the Expected Shortfall (plus two extensions). Although in the literature both of them have been 
used to measure risks in individual institutions, we are extending it to macro stress testing as if 
the Eurozone economy is a single institution by itself. 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝛽𝛽 is the maximum possible loss that 
the Eurozone economy experiences with probability 𝛽𝛽, while 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝛽𝛽 measures the average of the 
worst losses that occur with probability 1 − 𝛽𝛽. They are trying to capture risks conditional on 
an adverse scenario. Because our macro stress test aims at measuring the risk in the financial 
market from a macroeconomic perspective, rather than a microeconomic one, the analysis 
makes use of quarterly data to capture potential risks (see descriptive Table 1A in the Appendix 
for more details). In our case, instead of measuring returns, which is usually the common trend 
in micro stress tests, we estimate growth rates in our distributions, which are more relevant in 
measuring the economy instead of the Profit and Losses (P&Ls) of specific banks. We run the 
simulations for 10,000 times, which is the standard procedure in many statistical simulations.  
3.2. Including or not TARGET2 
VaR relies on the greatest lower bound on an arbitrarily defined risk frontier over an 
arbitrary fixed period of time, with Basel II prescribing at 99% confidence interval over a 
holding period of ten trading days (Chen, 2014). However, as Chen (2014) notes, Basel III 
appears poised to replace VaR with Expected Shortfall as the theoretically coherent alternative 
risk measure, with, however, one problem, that Expected Shortfall cannot be reliably back-
tested, something for which VaR holds a regulatory advantage. For clarity, we are not 
performing back-testing here. 
     When there is a procyclical relationship between bank profitability and business cycles, 
during the booming phases of the cycle there is a stronger impact on bank profitability, whilst 
during the recessionary phases, the performance of banking loan portfolios is jeopardised. This 
leads to credit losses and, thus, to lower banking profits (Apergis, 2009). To address this issue 
in our economy, we perform a rolling window approach that surfs over the business cycle in 
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order to examine the VaR evolution over time. Equal risk weighting allows us to pinpoint 
which variable has the greatest impact apart from the TARGET2 rates, which have been 
weighted according to ECB loan purchases. We are familiar though that risk-weighting was 
introduced in Basel II and allows, for example, risk-sensitive capital charges to counter the 
procyclicality effect by mitigating its impact (Heid, 2007). Our approach is expected to help 
by reflecting the current outlook for business-cycles conditions, which is in accordance with 
the European Banking Authority’s stress-testing methodology (EBA, 2017). The dependence 
on the business cycle is less pronounced when credit is more available (Antonakakis and 
Scharler, 2012), while our inclusion of TARGET2 balances is expected to remove any business 
cycle effects. 
3.3. Three different VaRs and Expected Shortfalls  
Historical simulation is a method for estimating VaR and was introduced by Boudoukh 
et al. (1998) and Barone-Adesi et al. (1998, 1999). The historical simulation is still predominant 
in a way that from Perignon and Smith’s (2010) survey of firms using risk modelling, 64.9% 
disclosed their methodology and 73% reported that they were still using historical simulation. 
The advantage of the historical simulation is that we do not have to make an assumption of the 
parametric form of the distribution and instead the dynamic evolution and the dependencies of 
the risk factors are inferred directly from historical observations.   
Monte Carlo VaR simulation is a very flexible methodology and can be applied to any 
assumed distribution for risk factor returns. The great advantage of Monte Carlo VaR is that 
historical data place no restriction on simulations. We can simulate as many data or risk factor 
returns as possible (the more simulations used, the more accurate the VaR estimates are). Given 
that sampling errors can be controlled, the main source of model risk in Monte Carlo VaR 
models lies with the specification of the statistical model for the risk factor growth rates. These 
models are used to translate standard uniform simulations into the risk factors growth rate 
simulations. We derive the Monte Carlo VaR from a quantile of the simulated portfolio growth 
rates. At extreme quantiles, it is not easy to estimate historical VaR, even with several thousand 
observations. The semi-parametric expansion of Cornish-Fisher is applied to improve the 
precision of quantile estimates. The problem with the Cornish-Fisher estimates is that they 
substantially overestimate VaR when data are leptokurtic. The procedure will also be 
implemented on a rolling window in order to examine the VaR over time. Stress tests will then 
take place by implementing the most extreme observations in order to examine how well 
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portfolios will fare with the presence of TARGET2. Additionally, we consider a Monte Carlo 
approach for the VaR, sampling 1000 observations and forming the distribution for each 
iteration.  
3.3.1. Historical VaR 
Despite that Pritsker (2006) has raised the alarm on the dangers of using a VaR through 
a historical simulation, the analysis in this work employs Historical Average VaR for 
benchmarking and compares the results with the Modified Cornish-Fisher VaR (Favre and 
Galeano, 2002). The Modified Cornish-Fisher VaR is an expansion that manages to encompass 
the variability that would have been explained by a more computationally intensive resampling 
approach, such as the Monte Carlo VaR. Additionally, both the Variance-Covariance VaR and 
the Expected Shortfall approaches will be employed. Still, when appropriately constructed, the 
objective information, such as historical correlations and volatility, can play an important role 
in stress testing (Kupiec, 1998). A common issue in many asset distributions is when the 
normality assumption of common VaR can be violated, because many assets may have fat tails 
(Tan and Chan, 2003), implying that there are far more occurrences at the tails than the 
Gaussian distribution would lead us to believe (Pafka and Kondor, 2001). The historical VaR 
is estimated as follows: 
𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 = 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(−𝑉𝑉,𝑝𝑝)                                                                                                        (1)  
with –R being the period negative returns for the p confidence level. The procedure will also 
be implemented on a rolling window in order to examine the VaR evolution over time. Stress 
tests will then take place by implementing the most extreme observations in order to examine 
how well portfolios will fare with the presence of TARGET2. Additionally, the analysis 
considers a Monte Carlo approach for the VaR, sampling 1000 observations and forming the 
portfolio for each iteration.  
3.3.2. Monte Carlo VaR 
We simulate a distribution for the h-quarters growth rates and the 100a% h-quarter VaR 
estimate is determined empirically as -1 times the quantile 𝑉𝑉 of the distribution. Specifically, 
we simulate data derived from a normal, 𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎2), distribution, with 𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎2 respectively being 
the sample mean and variance of the rolling window in the first exercise, and the stress size in 
the second, over 10,000 simulations. 
3.3.3. Cornish-Fisher VaR 
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The Cornish-Fisher expansion (Cornish and Fisher, 1937) to VaR is a semi-parametric 
method that estimates quantiles of non-normal distributions as a function of standard normal 
quantiles and the sample skewness and excess kurtosis. This method allows us to estimate the 
extreme quantiles from standard normal quantiles at high significance levels. The fourth order 
Cornish-Fisher approximation 𝑥𝑥�𝑎𝑎 to the 𝑉𝑉 quantile of a distribution with mean 0 and variance 
1 is: 
𝑥𝑥�𝑎𝑎 ≈  𝜔𝜔𝑎𝑎 +
𝜁𝜁
6
(𝜔𝜔𝛼𝛼2 − 1) +
𝜃𝜃�
24
𝜔𝜔𝛼𝛼(𝜔𝜔𝛼𝛼2 − 3) −
𝜁𝜁2
36
𝜔𝜔𝛼𝛼(2𝜔𝜔𝛼𝛼2 − 5)                                        (2) 
where 𝜔𝜔𝑎𝑎 = 𝛷𝛷(𝛼𝛼)−1  is the 𝑉𝑉 quantile of a standard normal distribution and 𝜁𝜁 and 𝜃𝜃� denote the 
skewness and excess kurtosis of the distribution, respectively, implying that if we have a mean 
?̂?𝜇 and standard deviation 𝜎𝜎� derived from the same distribution, then the quantile 𝑉𝑉 of the 
distribution would be: 
𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼 = 𝑥𝑥�𝑎𝑎𝜎𝜎� + ?̂?𝜇                                                                                                                                (3) 
To calculate the Cornish-Fisher VaR we need to ignore the mean and standard deviation and 
to apply the expansion (2) to approximate the 1% quantile of the normalized distribution having 
zero mean and unit variance.   
3.3.4. Historical Expected Shortfall  
VaR defines the level of loss that one is reasonably certain will not be exceeded. But 
VaR tells us nothing about the extent of the losses that could be incurred in the event that the 
VaR is exceeded. Historical expected shortfall is a more informative risk metric than VaR, 
because VaR does not measure the extent of exceptional losses. However, we obtain 
information about the average level of losses, given that the VaR is exceeded from the 
conditional VaR. The conditional VaR measure we consider is the Expected Shortfall or 
Conditional VaR (or expected tail loss). If 𝑋𝑋 denotes the discounted h-quarter growth rate, and 
set: 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉ℎ,𝑎𝑎 = −𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎                                                                                                                               (4) 
where 𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎 denotes the quantile 𝑉𝑉 for the distribution 𝑋𝑋, i.e.𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 < 𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎) = 𝑉𝑉. The expected tail 
loss or expected shortfall is expressed as a percentage of the distribution value: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎(𝑋𝑋) = −𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋|𝑍𝑍 < 𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎)                                                                                                       (5) 
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and since ETL is a conditional expectation, it is obtained by dividing the probability-weighted 
average of the values of 𝑋𝑋 that are less than 𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎 by 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 < 𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎). But 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 < 𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎) = 𝑉𝑉, so if 𝑋𝑋 has 
density function𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥), then: 




or the 100α% h-day expected shortfall defined as: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ,𝑎𝑎 = −𝐸𝐸�𝑋𝑋�ℎ|𝑋𝑋�ℎ < −𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉ℎ,𝑎𝑎�𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃                                                                                     (7) 
where 𝑋𝑋�ℎ denotes the discounted h-day active growth rate and 𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉ℎ,𝑎𝑎 is the 100α% h-day 
benchmark. The 1% expected shortfall is the average of the ten largest relative losses.   
3.3.5. Monte Carlo Expected Shortfall  
To account for path dependence, such as volatility clustering in risk factor growth rates 
(instead of returns used in finance), the general algorithm of ETL is modified for multistep 
Monte Carlo (MC). The MC method allows for a simulation environment in which each 
variable’s data are simulated from a Normal Distribution. As a result, the Traditional Means 
VaR/ES are able to perform far more adequately, compared to when the data distributions 
deviate from the normal. As seen in Table A1 and Figure A1 in the Appendix, there is a plethora 
of variables that have high skewness and kurtosis values.    
3.3.6. Cornish-Fisher Expected Shortfall  
Here we present some analytic formulae for the ETL when the historical distribution is 
fitted with a generalised Cornish-Fisher expansion. This is approximated by: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎 = 𝑓𝑓�𝑉𝑉−1𝑓𝑓(𝑍𝑍𝑎𝑎)�𝜎𝜎� − ?̂?𝜇                                                                                                      (8) 
where according to (2): 
𝑓𝑓�𝑉𝑉−1𝑓𝑓(𝑍𝑍𝑎𝑎)� = 𝑉𝑉−1𝑓𝑓(𝑍𝑍𝑎𝑎) +
𝜁𝜁
6







𝑉𝑉−1𝑓𝑓(𝑍𝑍𝑎𝑎)(2[𝑉𝑉−1𝑓𝑓(𝑍𝑍𝑎𝑎)]2 − 5)                                                            (9) 
 
3.4. Scenarios of extreme values with IFRS9 
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Following the replacement of the IAS39 with IFRS9 on January 1st, 2018, the argument 
is that the new international accounting standard is expected to reduce information asymmetries 
across countries and, subsequently, to increase cross-country comparability (Onali and Ginesti, 
2014). According to the new tax regime, banks in the Eurozone were requested to report under 
IFRS9 in the first quarter of 2018. Based on the methodological approach of the European 
Banking Association, stress tests need to take explicitly into consideration not only point data, 
but also projections (EBA, 2018). Subsequently, that introduces forecasting from a mere 
divination to actual scientific methods and is requested from banks to employ professional 
forecasters if they need to comply with future stress tests. For the stress test methodology, the 
analysis encompasses the IFRS9 for which we forecast time series values from Q2:2017 to 
Q4:2020. Usually, the forecasted period for performing stress tests is five years. Those values 
are forecasted with two benchmark methodologies, i.e. the historical mean and the median. For 
stress tests, we examine the worse scenarios, starting with the most five extreme values (out of 
80), up until to a less ‘stressed’ scenario of the 40 most extreme values. For all cases, we 
consider results for three significant levels, i.e. 90%, 95%, and 99%. 
With IFRS9 including forecasting, it is mandatory to predict values up to 2020 
(Q4:2020) (a typical forecast window is two years) and then we take extreme values to account 
for the stress testing scenarios. The initial plan was due to the ex-ante nature of the forecasts; 
benchmark models had to include historical mean and historical median, but because there were 
not any differences between those two, for the sake of space we included only historical means. 
Forecasting under IFRS9 will help us to estimate future expected credit losses (Chawla et al., 
2017) and arrange our scenarios based on a distribution that includes forecasted variables as 
well, and not only historical variables which were the common trend among scenarios before 
2018 under the old accounting regime. It is anticipated that the expected losses approach of 
IFRS9 will widen the scope of judgements triggered by market signals (Novotny-Farkas, 
2016).  
4. Generating macroeconomic stress tests 
In this estimation strategy, we have applied six different VaR metrics. Firstly, a rolling window 
estimation, and secondly a stressed environment setting. Weights to the TARGET2 values have 
been added in an attempt to extract more robust metric values. The weights are based on the 
relative ECB Bond Purchases. 
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The stressed tests involve a scenario which includes the most volatile observations of a 
variable from our dataset. We perform multiple stress tests for an increasing number of 
observations, starting with the five most extreme up to the forty most extreme observations. 
The VaR methodology is different from others (i.e., regressions, panel, time-series) because 
this methodology does not require the presence of depended and/or independent variables. All 
variables are treated likewise simultaneously (equally weighted as well, if so required), and 
then, they are used to estimate the VaR. Dynamic Stress test, as explained in Gersl et al. (2012), 
which involves the estimation of the predictions of the dependent variable using additionally 
the predictions of the independent variables. Because VaR does not require such an approach, 
we still enter a dynamic approach by including the predicted values of the variables in the 
sample to select the extreme values. 
We generated 3D graphs of the mean values for the following metrics: VaR, Cornish-
Fisher VaR, Monte Carlo VaR, Expected Shortfall, Cornish-Fisher ES and Monte Carlo 
Expected Shortfall including TARGET2 (Figure 2) and without TARGET2 (Figure 1). The 
rolling window test values are plotted in Figure 1 in time up to the fourth quarter of 2020 for 
different alphas. These are set out in column one. It can be illustrated how the values of the 
abovementioned metrics are fluctuating as we move in time against different confidence 
intervals. In the second column, we replace the axis of time with the number of extreme values 
in our stressed scenarios.  
We can early derive from these comparisons that the rolling window scenarios are more 
pessimistic of the future. At the same time, when the number of extreme values increases, then 
the stressed scenarios are smoothed, implying that the importance of a shock is reduced. 
Additionally, when the variable TARGET2 is included in the distributions, the importance of 
the coming crisis is reduced. We are trying here (Figure 2) to improve the stress test values by 
adding in the data pool the values from TARGET2. In other words, it shows the robustness of 
the stress tests and its ability to withstand tinkering without its main message being affected. 
This is true as both capture the shocks from the 2008 financial crisis. What is happening is that 
without including the TARGET2 variable, the stress tests indicate that the economy is heading 
for a crisis even more serious than the one experienced in 2008. The conclusion at this stage 
must be that the leap to adding TARGET2 values in the scenarios is optimistic and by 
implementing this treatment it is very early to head to a new crisis. Yet, can we safely say that 
voices of a coming crisis are not taking into consideration the implicit mechanism of Eurozone? 
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Take, firstly, the metrics values (Figure 1), they denote a somewhat stable period 
between Q1:2009 to Q1:2016, followed by a rapid increase in VaRs. C-F VaR, which for the 
same period denotes a rapid decrease, followed by a similar scale increase in Q3:2017. 
Moreover, C-F ES denotes a rapid increase during the Q2:2016 period, which is followed by a 
decrease after Q4:2018. Q2:2016 is the period of a rapid increase in VaR metrics values, 
continued to the forecasted period. For the same period, CF VaR denotes a decrease in values, 
which for the quarters of 2020 are increasing. Using the five most volatile observations of each 
variable, we proceed to add in the stress sample the immediate following less volatile 
observations. Following the guidelines of the IRFS9 in the selection sample, we have included 
the forecasted observations (derived using a simple mean forecast) as well. This implies that 
for these stress tests, if a forecasted observation is highly volatile, it will then be included in 
the sample. We conclude this part when the sample consists of the 40 most volatile 
observations. All metrics follow a similar pattern, but for the case of MC ES there is a curve 
peaking at 22 extreme values. The MC ES increased rapidly after the 15th observation, finishing 
with the highest value of all metrics. In the right panel, MC ES increases constantly until the 
24th observation, followed by a steady decline, leaving the MC ES with the highest value of all 
metrics.    
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
At this point, there is a fundamental question to answer, which may radically affect the 
perspective in which we view the quality of the stress tests for the Eurozone stability. 
Potentially, there exists other evidence which points the other way, i.e. to a sharpened increase 
in 2008 and less sharp values for 2020. For this reason, we need to add a variable often 
disregarded in the macroeconomic analysis; this is the value of interbank transfers. In Figure 
2, for the time span between Q2:2011 and Q1:2016, the VaRs are the lowest throughout the 
whole span across all portfolio metrics. After Q1:2016, there is a small rise in these metrics 
and then becomes stable. This stability continues over the forecasted time period. C-F ES’s 
values follow a slight increase, which is followed by another decrease at the Q3:2017. All 
forecasted periods are denoted by a steady increase in VaR. Over the period Q1:2012 to 
Q1:2016, the VaRs are the lowest throughout the whole time span across all portfolio metrics, 
except in the case of C-F ES, which reports a small increasing trend. After Q1:2016, there is a 
small rise in all metrics and stability, which continues over the forecasted time period. There 
is a noted decrease in the values of the metrics until Q1:2016. After Q2:2016, all metrics values 
remain stable, except in the case of the CF VaR. Overall, the conclusions derived from the 
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stress tests in Figures 1 & 2, are always subject to a question mark, because of the unavoidable 
arbitrariness of the variables used or the forecasted horizon. The crudest way of coping with 
this includes the typical set of macroeconomic variables as we did here.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
5. Final remarks 
The outcome of economic downturn, apart from the reduction or deceleration in GDP 
growth (Serva, 2010), and the rise of unemployment, has a serious social impact, such as rising 
suicide rates (Fountoulakis et al., 2015), which can further be exacerbated by the negative 
climate generated during policy uncertainty and attributed to the way in which particular 
incidents are handled by authorities (Antonakakis and Gupta, 2017). The recent economic 
downturn occurred mainly by a financial crisis when a significant portion of toxic financial 
instruments found their way into commercial and investment bank balance sheets and raised 
suspicions over their solvency (Brunnermeir, 2009). Not surprisingly, though, they managed 
to honour their credit lines drawn by firms only because liquidity provision was largely 
supported by governments or governmental agencies (Acharya and Mora, 2015). With this 
paper, our intention has been to prevent protectionism to establish itself in the banking sector 
and to allow entrepreneurial human capital to contribute with new businesses in this sector. 
With our stress test methodology, instead of focusing directly on the existing banks and their 
efficiency, the empirical findings suggest that the lens should zoom out and focalise on the 
entire economy. With this approach, instead of trying to protect the existing banking 
establishments, we can safely assume that lowering down the volatile curves of our stress test 
will effectively require new players to enter the banking arena. New players carrying with them 
their new marketing methodologies and new technology, can now compete against the existing 
banks and allow for more employment vacancies. However, there is a key point, here we need 
to learn. A serious crisis is coming in 2020, but the TARGET2 mechanism seems to mitigate 
the forthcoming crisis. Can we say that the TARGET2 infrastructure will help Eurozone to 
protect itself from another crisis? Probably yes. But there is more to that story as TARGET2 is 
not only an anticyclical tool, but also is accompanied by imbalances, which need to be rectified, 
if Eurozone policy makers wish to keep this mechanism working and convince country-
members against exiting the mechanism. But is the TARGET2 mechanism sustainable? This 
argument is discussed in the next and final section.   
6. Policy implications for the Eurozone 
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The Eurozone is geographically so large and economically so heterogeneous that the different 
regions are subject to different business cycles and asymmetric macroeconomic and financial 
shocks (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993). Before the recent financial crisis, when capital 
flowed in towards the core countries of the Eurozone in the belief that it was safe against the 
peripheral countries leaving the euro16, at that point, the Eurozone lacked a centralised fiscal 
stabilization mechanism by which to provide counter-cyclical intervention (Fingleton et al., 
2015). Some of the optimal currency area theory (Mundell, 1961) conditions were met, but 
others were missing. The common fiscal capacity was the main missing element. The 
effectiveness of the current common budget as a shock absorption mechanism is negligible. 
Financial integration allows funds to be channelled from core countries to peripheries. When 
the long-feared shock of the global financial crisis hit, the cost of adjustment fell mainly on 
labour; as a result, higher and longer unemployment occurred (Pasimeni, 2014).   
The Eurozone has certain structural and investment funds whose presence is to invest 
in job creation and to a sustainable European economy as part of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP)17, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), 
the Cohesion Fund (CF), the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) 
and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF). None of them, however, is intended 
to address the shorter economic problems that arise due to the presence of asymmetric 
macroeconomic and financial shocks.  
Despite claims of the optimal currency area, there is no effective single market in 
services, workers and capital. There is no mutual recognition of qualifications between member 
countries, no portability of pension rights, wage rigidities, while despite the presence of a 
capital markets union, European markets are far from being integrated. In response to the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the banking crisis that pushed toward this direction, the EU 
set up the European System of Financial Supervision (EFSF). The EFSF comprises the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), with its aim to mitigate systemic risk and the three 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESA) to incentivise banking, financial and pension 
institutions from taking excessive risks18. Additionally, the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) set up to preserve financial stability and provide financial assistance in order to bail out 
                                                          
16 Or forced to do so. 
17 With focus on restricting members from running budget deficits exceeding 3% of their GDP with a fine of 0.5% 
of their GDP if they do so, or having national debts exceeding 60% of their GDP. 
18 Namely, these are the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA) and the Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). 
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banks in distress19, and the Securities Market Program (SMP) to ensure liquidity in 
malfunctioning segments of the bond markets, where transactions had a significant effect on 
bond prices. European bond markets are complicated by different insolvency laws across 
member countries, which implies that the lack of a unified European corporate bond market 
raises costs for companies, deters investors and holds down liquidity that funds growth 
activities. That makes EMU members rely solely on a combination of market forces (labour 
and capital mobility) and structural funds to achieve long-run convergence of per capita GDPs.  
This policy, however, has been unsuccessful. Instead, we have seen an agglomeration 
effect, where the wealthier areas attract capital and skills (Akiba and Iida, 2009). According to 
Connolly and Whittaker (2003), the euro has enabled fiscally-lax governments to gain from 
core countries’ reputation for fiscal and monetary prudence, implying that the membership in 
the EMU ‘club’ dilutes the financial discipline that would be faced by an independent 
government and makes it more likely that some governments will succumb to this pressure. 
We argue that certain policies are needed to escape the liquidity trap, either by unconventional 
monetary policies or a strong fiscal stimulus. ECB’s slow response towards quantitative easing 
(QE) is evidence that it is the wrong bank for this role. To be exact, it is the wrong mechanism.  
QE is an unconventional form of monetary policy, where the central banks create new 
money electronically to buy financial assets, such as government bonds. This will raise the 
prices of financial assets and lower their yields with the hope to increase private sector spending 
and lower the returns to savings. In our analysis above we introduced TARGET2 capital flows, 
instead of national debt. The reason was that a country’s national debt to Eurozone 
governments is the sum of its government bonds held by other Eurozone national central banks 
plus the TARGET2 liability of its national central bank20. According to Blake (2018), QE 
operates like that: QE is principally implemented by the National Central Banks which 
purchase their own government bonds in proportion to their capital key, which is the proportion 
to the NCB’s share in the capital of the ECB. The ECB sets collateral standards for refinancing 
the QE purchases, but has weakened those to enable the peripheral NCBs to continue providing 
liquidity. In fact, when the quality of available collateral became so poor, the ECB allowed 
                                                          
19 In September 2012, the ECB introduced the program of Outright Monetary transactions (OMT) under which it 
makes purchases or outright transactions in the secondary market of bonds issued by Eurozone members, with the 
aim to safeguard an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy or to 
rescue ailing Banks. The ESM was originally formed as an alternative for Eurobonds and was introduced when 
core countries objected bailing out peripheral countries.  
 
20 Owed to ECB. 
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NCBs to extend Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA)21. This is how and why the TARGET2 
imbalances grew high. When a peripheral bank was making a loan to a consumer to import 
from a core country, the bank could use that loan as a collateral for a new loan to another 
consumer wishing also to import from a core country. This implies that at a certain point of 
time, TARGET2 debits are liquidity created in one part of the Eurozone to finance the 
acquisition of goods imported from another part of the Eurozone22.  
The question goes like this: Is TARGET2 bailing out the Euro? The answer is you bail 
out the Eurozone economy. You cannot bail out the medium (e.g., the currency). This is evident 
from our 3D graphs. However, that is happening temporally, because the trough ends (Figure 
1) and a new crisis arrives at the gates. This is what our stress tests for Eurozone indicate. 
TARGET2 has allowed core countries to repatriate capital and convert private claims into 
sovereign claims, thus mitigating the impact of crisis (Figure 2). Governments did use the 
TARGET2 mechanism to finance deficits, through borrowing from commercial banks by 
selling them short-term T-bills. The debts of the TARGET2 mechanism are effectively being 
mutualised across Eurozone members. Under the EBU, bank rescues would include Private 
Sector Involvement (PSI), including depositors, shareholders and junior bondholders who 
share the burden alongside taxpayers. To this end, the European Commission has pushed for 
the harmonisation of national insolvency laws and a further tightening of the state aid rules.  
Another question remains: is there a solution to this spiral or a vicious cycle of rising 
TARGET2 imbalances? Can we keep the mechanism afloat? The answer is in the affirmative, 
and the solution is twofold. First, EMU members should work on the strengthening of the long-
term sustainability structural funds and secondly, they should work on empowering a short-
term shock absorption mechanism that will preserve TARGET2 as a counter-cyclical effect on 
the next crisis.  
Specifically, empowering the European Commission Investment Plan for Europe, 
which is known as the EU Infrastructure Investment Plan23, with the aim to unlock public and 
                                                          
21 That meant that the NCB approved the collateral, where the NCB carried the risk rather than pooling them via 
the ECB. 
22 Similar is our story of one wine trader and one potato seller who was alcoholic. Both of them carried one coin 
and on their way to town the potato seller was buying wine from the wine trader and keep borrowing from the 
same coin again and again. The coin was in a physical form. However, that does not mean that the debt has been 
repaid. Like the Target 2 mechanism, the coin was exchanging hands when the wine seller was giving the coin in 
the potato seller palm. The potato seller still has his potatoes to sell, pay his debt and buy food for his family. So 
the problem is not the medium. In the Eurozone case, a core country is the wine trader who does not eat potatoes.  
23 Its purpose is to invest in infrastructure needs in Eurozone and start-up companies.  
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private investments in the real economy. As research from Apergis and Apergis (2018) 
indicates, infrastructure investments24 are endogenous to economic growth and the margin 
from investing in countries with already advanced infrastructure is non-existent compared to 
the massive return on investments from investing in countries with low infrastructure. For 
instance, in a country like Greece25, we observe that from the total of 75 infrastructure and 
innovation projects requested funding across all Eurozone countries, 49 of them were requested 
by Greece alone. That corresponds to 65.3% of the total Eurozone needs that still need to be 
met, thus, ranking the country first in the European Fund for Strategic Investment per GDP. 
How can we possibly speak about optimal currency area and convergence when the 
infrastructure disparities are so high? Currency alone will reflect this heterogeneity in the 
business cycles process and the subsequent disparity in infrastructure funding. By unlocking 
the tap in infrastructure periphery countries can finally exploit their competitive advantage and 
reverse the financial flows of TARGET2 by mitigating any imbalances. This can happen when 
firms find the prerequisite infrastructure to facilitate their operations, thus, minimizing the 
impact of the next crisis and acting as the long awaiting need for a fiscal union.  
Overall, we have come to these conclusions, because the TARGET2 system assists by 
mitigating the impact of the next financial crisis on the Eurozone. Yet, the imbalances might 
not be enough to keep the mechanism from preventing the next crisis from occurring. As a 
result, we need to fix these imbalances, while keeping the mechanism operating at full capacity 
and help to reduce the effects of another crisis. 
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24 Including infrastructure in energy utilities, motorways, railway, renewable, pipeline, port, airport, LNG 
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Fig. 1. No TARGET2 stress tests of VaR, Cornish-Fisher VaR, Monte Carlo VaR, Expected 
Shortfall, Cornish-Fisher Expected Shortfall and Monte Carlo Expected Shortfall for both 




























Fig. 2. TARGET2 stress tests of VaR, Cornish-Fisher VaR, Monte Carlo VaR, Expected 
Shortfall, Cornish-Fisher Expected Shortfall and Monte Carlo Expected Shortfall for both 























Variables Used Kurtosis Skewness 
Price indexes or Eurozone countries and more   
FRANCE CAC 40 - PRICE INDEX  -0.63 0.55 
DAX 30 PERFORMANCE - PRICE INDEX  -0.89 1.46 
FTSE 100 - PRICE INDEX  -0.36 0.48 
ATX - AUSTRIAN TRADED INDEX - PRICE INDEX  -0.78 0.73 
BEL 20 - PRICE INDEX  -0.88 0.96 
ATHEX COMPOSITE - PRICE INDEX  -0.22 -0.13 
OMX TALLINN (OMXT) - PRICE INDEX  0.28 0.63 
OMX HELSINKI 25 (OMXH25) - PRICE INDEX  -0.52 -0.16 
ISEQ 20 - PRICE INDEX  -0.75 0.62 
FTSE MIB INDEX - PRICE INDEX  -0.16 -0.09 
OMX RIGA (OMXR) - TOT RETURN IND  -0.35 0.64 
OMX VILNIUS (OMXV) - TOT RETURN IND  0.60 2.39 
LUXEMBOURG SE LUXX - PRICE INDEX  -0.82 0.56 
MALTA SE MSE - PRICE INDEX  0.72 1.07 
AEX INDEX (AEX) - PRICE INDEX  -0.83 0.41 
PORTUGAL PSI-20 - PRICE INDEX  0.05 -0.50 
SX SAX 12 SHARE PRICE INDEX (EP) NADJ  1.18 2.40 
IBEX 35 - PRICE INDEX  -0.09 -0.76 
Unemployment rates of Eurozone countries and more   
BD UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, ALL PERSONS (AGES 15 AND OVER)  0.09 -1.31 
LX UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, ALL PERSONS (AGES 15 AND OVER)   -0.45 0.32 
FN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, ALL PERSONS (AGES 15 AND OVER)   -0.82 -0.22 
EO UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, ALL PERSONS (AGES 15 AND OVER)   0.64 -0.04 
IR UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, ALL PERSONS (AGES 15 AND OVER)   0.37 -1.54 
BG UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, ALL PERSONS (AGES 15 AND OVER)  -0.56 -0.74 
PT UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, ALL PERSONS (AGES 15 AND OVER)   0.34 -0.93 
OE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, ALL PERSONS (AGES 15 AND OVER)  -0.38 -1.01 
IT UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, ALL PERSONS (AGES 15 AND OVER)   0.31 -1.24 
GR UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, ALL PERSONS (AGES 15 AND OVER)  0.52 -1.52 
SJ UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, ALL PERSONS (AGES 15 AND OVER)   0.26 -0.81 
FR UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, ALL PERSONS (AGES 15 AND OVER)  0.03 -1.08 
NL UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, ALL PERSONS (AGES 15 AND OVER)  0.33 -1.01 
SX UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, ALL PERSONS (AGES 15 AND OVER)  0.13 -0.99 
ES UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, ALL PERSONS (AGES 16 AND OVER)  0.15 -1.56 
IT UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, ALL PERSONS (AGES 15 AND OVER)   0.31 -1.24 
LN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (AR)  0.03 -0.97 
CP LABOUR MARKETS: UNEMPLOYMENT RATE NADJ  0.68 -1.17 
ECB main rate   
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ECB MAIN RATE ANNOUNCEMENT DAY - MIDDLE RATE  0.41 -1.07 
Euribor rate   
EK 3-MONTH EURIBOR NADJ  0.40 -1.11 
Inflation rate   
IT CONSUMER PRICE INDEX – HARMONISED 7.64 57.50 
LX CONSUMER PRICE INDEX - HARMONISED  5.11 37.17 
EO CONSUMER PRICE INDEX - HARMONISED  7.12 52.27 
ES CONSUMER PRICE INDEX - HARMONISED   0.79 11.65 
BG CONSUMER PRICE INDEX - HARMONISED  6.09 43.27 
FR CONSUMER PRICE INDEX - HARMONISED   1.19 7.59 
IR CONSUMER PRICE INDEX - HARMONISED   -4.77 22.87 
OE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX - HARMONISED  -6.53 46.03 
FN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX - HARMONISED  5.11 39.42 
GR CONSUMER PRICE INDEX - HARMONISED  4.75 27.76 
BD CONSUMER PRICE INDEX – HARMONISED -1.01 16.12 
NL CONSUMER PRICE INDEX – HARMONISED -6.44 45.08 
PT CONSUMER PRICE INDEX - HARMONISED   6.24 43.88 
SJ CONSUMER PRICE INDEX - HARMONISED  -3.68 23.40 
SX CONSUMER PRICE INDEX – HARMONISED -7.18 53.33 
Eurozone GDP growth rate   
FN GDP (\%QOQ) -2.64 13.88 
GR GDP (\%QOQ) -0.45 0.32 
FR GDP (\%QOQ) -1.78 5.39 
PT GDP (\%QOQ) -0.85 0.44 
BD GDP (\%QOQ) -2.72 13.34 
IT GDP (\%QOQ) -1.58 3.73 
NL GDP (\%QOQ) -1.85 8.05 
BG GDP (\%QOQ) -1.49 5.41 
OE GDP (\%QOQ) -0.80 1.10 
ES GDP (\%QOQ) -1.02 -0.11 
IR GDP (\%QOQ) 3.75 21.46 
SX GDP (\%QOQ) -3.31 22.13 
Exchange rates   
JAPANESE YEN TO EURO (WMR) - EXCHANGE RATE  -0.60 0.08 
CHINESE YUAN TO EURO (WMR) - EXCHANGE RATE  -0.08 -0.32 
US \$ TO EURO (WMR\ DS) - EXCHANGE RATE -0.03 -0.53 
UK £ TO EURO (WMR\ DS) - EXCHANGE RATE 1.61 5.34 
SOUTH AFRICA RAND TO EURO (WMR) - EXCHANGE RATE  1.25 1.81 
RUSSIAN ROUBLE TO EURO (WMR) - EXCHANGE RATE  2.43 11.36 
INDIAN RUPEE TO EURO (WMR) - EXCHANGE RATE  0.01 -0.37 
NEW TURKISH LIRA TO EURO (WMR) - EXCHANGE RATE  2.95 11.80 
SWISS FRANC TO EURO (WMR) - EXCHANGE RATE  -2.03 7.33 
NORWEGIAN KRONE TO EURO (WMR) - EXCHANGE RATE  1.31 2.67 
SOUTH KOREAN WON TO EURO (WMR) - EXCHANGE RATE  0.19 0.25 
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SAUDI RIYAL TO EURO (WMR) - EXCHANGE RATE  -0.02 -0.54 
CANADIAN \$ TO EURO (WMR) - EXCHANGE RATE  0.13 0.05 
BRAZILIAN REAL TO EURO (WMR) - EXCHANGE RATE  1.50 3.64 
Oil price is US dollars   
OPEC Oil Basket Price U\$/Bbl  -0.53 0.85 
Volatility index   
VDAX-NEW VOLATILITY INDEX - PRICE INDEX  2.27 7.10 
EM FINANCIAL DERIV ASSETS (NET, MARKED TO MKT), SWAPS, MO
N AUTHS  
6.98 50.67 
GDP growth rates of countries with trade links with EU   
CH GDP (\%QOQ)  -1.05 -0.76 
US GDP (\%QOQ)   -1.64 4.69 
JP GDP (\%QOQ)  -1.77 6.91 
SA GDP (\%QOQ)  -0.71 0.92 
IN GDP (\%QOQ)  0.48 -0.60 
RS GDP (\%QOQ)  -0.94 -0.67 
TK GDP (\%QOQ)   -0.52 -1.20 
SW GDP (\%QOQ)  -1.13 2.35 
NW GDP (\%QOQ)  0.11 0.44 
KO GDP (\%QOQ)   -1.65 8.65 
UK GDP (\%QOQ)  -2.19 6.18 
BR GDP (\%QOQ)   -0.99 1.33 
CN GDP (\%QOQ)  -1.74 5.15 
10-year long term government bond yields   
BG  3.66 21.09 
OE  4.23 25.90 
FR  4.86 30.81 
BS  -4.68 26.97 
GR  1.21 3.84 
IR  1.22 4.48 
IT  1.08 4.61 
NL  6.83 49.57 
PT  -0.09 0.11 
ES  -0.00 0.25 
US  0.94 1.64 
UK  1.24 6.45 
CN  0.94 2.77 
JP  -7.21 52.77 
Target 2 balances for Eurozone countries   
IT TARGET2 BALANCES (AVERAGE)  -2.19 9.35 
OE TARGET2 BALANCES (AVERAGE)  7.68 58.00 
LX TARGET2 BALANCES (AVERAGE)  -3.20 17.92 
BG TARGET2 BALANCES (AVERAGE)  0.39 4.81 
IR TARGET2 BALANCES (AVERAGE)   2.09 11.27 
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BD TARGET2 BALANCES (AVERAGE)  -2.33 19.22 
NL TARGET2 BALANCES (AVERAGE)  7.67 57.80 
FN TARGET2 BALANCES (AVERAGE)  -7.55 56.65 
GR TARGET2 BALANCES (AVERAGE)  4.15 18.58 
PT TARGET2 BALANCES (AVERAGE)   1.63 7.14 
ES TARGET2 BALANCES (AVERAGE)   -7.46 55.67 
FR TARGET2 BALANCES (AVERAGE)   0.66 16.78 
Credit Default Swaps Spreads – 10 year premium for Eurozone Countries    
IT CDS spread  5.10 1.98 
OE CDS spread -0.36 0.90 
LX CDS spread . . 
BG CDS spread . . 
IR CDS  spread 2.68 1.44 
BD CDS spread - base country 0 0 
NL CDS spread . . 
FN CDS spread . . 
GR CDS spread 0.18 1.37 
PT CDS  spread 2.63 1.51 
ES CDS  spread 10.13 2.84 
FR CDS  spread -0.20 0.92 
CY CDS spread (added to compensate for lack of data for LX, BG, NL & FN) 4.92 1.86 
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Fig. A1. Distributions of variables. 
 
